000			01804nam a22001577a 4500
999			_c519130 _d519130
008			220201b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
100			_aWilliamson, R.D., Morris, J.C. and Jonathan, M.F. _932024
245			_aPublic corruption and pension underfunding in the American states
260			_aAmerican Review of Public Administration
300			_a51(6), Aug, 2021: p.449-466
520			_aUnfunded public pension obligations represent a great challenge for policy makers in the American states. We posit that a part of pension underfunding relates to the level of public corruption. Empirical findings in the article show that funding ratios in public pension funds are inversely related to the incidence levels of corruption in the state, with other fiscal, political, and institutional covariates held constant. We show that this can happen through higher pension benefits, lower actuarially required contributions (ARCs), lower percentage of actual ARC contributions, and poorer investment outcomes. Based on empirical estimates, we find that a reduction of corruption by one standard deviation around the mean would permit the states to save on pension benefits by 10.24% annually (or US$1,894.64 per recipient), increase required ARC by 4.40%, increase actual ARC contributions by 8.46%, and improve investment returns by 4.72%. Therefore, policies to reduce public-sector corruption, or to improve the insulation of pension funds in relatively more corrupt environments, can make a significant contribution toward tackling the public pension underfunding crisis in the American states. – Reproduced
650			_aPublic corruption, Public pension underfunding, US states’ fiscal health _929407
773			_aAmerican Review of Public Administration
906			_aCORRUPTION
942			_cAR