000			01138nam a22001457a 4500
999			_c519276 _d519276
008			220217b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
100			_aWeaver, Jeffrey _932275
245			_aJobs for sale: Corruption and misallocation in hiring
260			_aThe American Economic Review
300			_a111(10), Oct, 2021: p.3093-3122
520			_aCorrupt government hiring is common in developing countries. This paper uses original data to document the operation and consequences of corrupt hiring in a health bureaucracy. Hires pay bribes averaging 17 months of salary, but contrary to conventional wisdom, their observable quality is comparable to counterfactual merit-based hires. Exploiting variation across jobs, I show that the consequences of corrupt allocations depend on the correlation between wealth and quality among applicants: service delivery outcomes are good for jobs where this was positive and poor when negative. In this setting, the correlation was typically positive, leading to relatively good performance of hires. – Reproduced
773			_a The American Economic Review
906			_aEMPLOYMENT
942			_cAR