000			01579nam a22001577a 4500
999			_c519330 _d519330
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100			_aDimitrakos, Thodoris _932281
245			_aThe source of epistemic normativity: Scientific change as an explanatory problem
260			_aPhilosophy of the Social Sciences
300			_a51(5), Sep, 2021: p.469-506
520			_aIn this paper, I present the problem of scientific change as an explanatory problem, that is, as a philosophical problem concerning what logical forms of explanation we should employ in order to understand the major conceptual ruptures throughout the history of science. I distinguish between two logical forms of explanation: (a) empirical-scientific and (b) normative explanations. Based on this distinction, I distinguish between the scientific and the liberal versions of naturalism concerning the issue of scientific change. I argue in favor of the latter by showing that normative explanations are indispensable in order to fully understand scientific change. I also argue that we can defend scientific rationality without violating the naturalistic framework which is dominant in contemporary analytic philosophy. I conclude that endorsing scientific realism within a naturalistic framework is the only option for preserving scientific rationality. – Reproduced
650			_aScientific change, Normativity, Naturalism, Scientific explanation, Scientific rationality, Scientific realism _930206
773			_aPhilosophy of the Social Sciences
906			_aSCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
942			_cAR