000			01743nam a22001577a 4500
999			_c519338 _d519338
008			220225b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
100			_aClosa, Carlos _932289
245			_aInstitutional logics and the EU’s limited sanctioning capacity under article 7 TEU
260			_aInternational Political Science Review
300			_a42(4), Sep, 2021: p.501-515
520			_aSeveral European Union (EU) governments have infringed the obligation to respect ‘rule of law’ as demanded by the European Union Treaty but, despite its supranational features, the EU has done little to sanction those violations. Why? The European Union’s institutional features paradoxically permit (and even encourage) logics that might be inhibiting its sanctioning capacity. Thus, a partisanship logic informs the European Parliament and this protects errant states. Then, the Commission, rather than acting assertively, anticipates the Council’s stance and adapts also its actions to anticipate a ‘compliance dilemma’ (i.e. compliance depends ultimately on the good will and cooperation of domestic authorities). The Commission prefers to channel its sanctioning activity via other softer instruments (e.g. infringement procedures). Finally, a distaste for increasing EU competence, ideological sympathy for illiberal governments, or fears of spillovers from sanctioning activity inform the action of governments within the Council. Those three institutional logics combine to explain the unexpectedly low sanctioning record for breaches of EU values. – Reproduced
650			_aRule of law, EU institutions, Compliance, Enforcement _930221
773			_aInternational Political Science Review
906			_aINTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
942			_cAR