000			01179nam a22001577a 4500
999			_c519858 _d519858
008			220510b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
100			_aDoerr, Annabelle and Necker, Sarah _933138
245			_aCollaborative tax evasion in the provision of services to consumers: A field experiment
260			_aAmerican Economic Journal: Economic Policy
300			_a13(4), Nov, 2021: p.185-216
520			_aWe conduct a field experiment with sellers of home improvement services on two German online markets. We take the role of consumers and vary whether we request an invoice for the delivery of the service. In a market that allows anyone to sell anonymously, a willingness to evade is prevalent. In a market that keeps track of credentials, sellers are only willing to evade when a willingness to collude is signaled. The evasion discount is in most estimates not larger than the tax subsidy for legal demand. Evasion is unlikely to be beneficial for many consumers in our setting. – Reproduced
650			_aOnline markets, Tax Evasion discount, Tax subsidy, Consumers _933139
773			_aAmerican Economic Journal: Economic Policy
906			_aTAXATION
942			_cAR