000			01255nam a22001577a 4500
999			_c519860 _d519860
008			220511b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
100			_aDaugherty, Andrew F. and Reinganum, Jennifer F. _933143
245			_aProsecutor quality, witness participations, crime, and reform
260			_aAmerican Economic Journal: Microeconomics
300			_a13(4), Nov, 2021: p.64-100
520			_aWe develop a model wherein concerns about prosecutor quality reduce the willingness of witnesses to cooperate with prosecutors. This causes an increase in the crime rate and in wrongly convicted innocent defendants. Because citizens are taxpayers and may be victims, perpetrators, witnesses, or falsely accused defendants, they care about the prosecutor's quality. They update beliefs about this quality based on the disposition of cases. If the prosecutor's believed quality falls below a threshold, then a majority of voters chooses to replace the prosecutor with a challenger, in expectation of reform. We compare the majority's choice with that of a social planner. – Reproduced
650			_aProsecutor quality, Witness participations, Crime and reform _933144
773			_aAmerican Economic Journal: Microeconomics
906			_aCRIMES
942			_cAR