000			01192nam a22001457a 4500
999			_c519898 _d519898
008			220513b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
100			_aEchenique, F., Miralles, A. and Zhang, J. _933267
245			_aConstrained pseudo-market equilibrium
260			_aAmerican Economic Review
300			_a111(11), Nov, 2021: p.3699-3732
520			_aWe propose a pseudo-market solution to resource allocation problems subject to constraints. Our treatment of constraints is general: including bihierarchical constraints due to considerations of diversity in school choice, or scheduling in course allocation; and other forms of constraints needed to model, for example, the market for roommates, combinatorial assignment problems, and knapsack constraints. Constraints give rise to pecuniary externalities, which are internalized via prices. Agents pay to the extent that their purchases affect the value the of relevant constraints at equilibrium prices. The result is a constrained-efficient market-equilibrium outcome. The outcome is fair to the extent that constraints treat agents symmetrically. – Reproduced
773			_aAmerican Economic Review
906			_aECONOMICS
942			_cAR