000			01605nam a22001577a 4500
999			_c520284 _d520284
008			220906b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
100			_aKroll, Alexander and Moynihan, Donald P.V. _933860
245			_aTools of control? Comparing congressional and presidential performance management reforms
260			_aPublic Administration Review
300			_a81(4), Jul-Aug, 2021: p.599-609
520			_aPresidents are claimed to have a stronger interest in an effective bureaucracy than Congress because they must be responsive to the public as a whole rather than narrow interests. We examine this claim in the context of multiple waves of U.S. performance management reforms: the Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) of 1993, the Program Assessment Rating Tool (PART ) (2002–2008), and the GPRA Modernization Act (GPRAMA) of 2010. Using four waves of federal employee surveys spanning 17 years, we measure reform success as employees’ purposeful use of performance data as a result of being exposed to routines embedded in the reforms. We find that the legislative-led GPRAMA is associated with more purposeful data use on aggregate while the PART executive reform succumbed to a partisan pattern of implementation. Statutory reforms are less likely to be experienced as ideological tools than executive branch reforms used by the president to impose control over agencies. – Reproduced
650			_aBureaucracy, Government Performance and Results Act, Program Assessment Rating Tool (PART) _933861
773			_aPublic Administration Review
906			_aBUREAUCRACY
942			_cAR