000			01205nam a22001457a 4500
999			_c520321 _d520321
008			220907b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
100			_aArmstrong, Mark and Zhou, Jidong _933915
245			_aConsumer information and the limits to competition
260			_aAmerican Economic Review
300			_a112(2), Feb, 2022: p.534-577
520			_aThis paper studies competition between firms when consumers observe a private signal of their preferences over products. Within the class of signal structures that induce pure-strategy pricing equilibria, we derive signal structures that are optimal for firms and those that are optimal for consumers. The firm-optimal policy amplifies underlying product differentiation, thereby relaxing competition, while ensuring consumers purchase their preferred product, thereby maximizing total welfare. The consumer-optimal policy dampens differentiation, which intensifies competition, but induces some consumers to buy their less preferred product. Our analysis sheds light on the limits to competition when the information possessed by consumers can be designed flexibly.- Reproduced
773			_aAmerican Economic Review
906			_aCONSUMERS
942			_cAR