000			01215nam a22001457a 4500
999			_c520322 _d520322
008			220907b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
100			_aLoertscher, Simon and Marx, Leslie M. _933917
245			_aIncomplete information bargaining with applications to mergers, investment, and vertical integration
260			_aAmerican Economic Review
300			_a112(2), Feb, 2022: p.616-649
520			_aWe provide an incomplete information bargaining framework that captures the effects of differential bargaining power in markets with multiple buyers and multiple suppliers. The market is modeled as a mechanism that maximizes the expected weighted welfare of the firms, subject to the constraints of incentive compatibility, individual rationality, and no deficit. We show that, in this model, there is no basis for the presumption that vertical integration increases equally weighted social surplus, while it is possible that horizontal mergers that appropriately change bargaining weights increase social surplus. Moreover, efficient bargaining implies that in equilibrium noncontractible investments are efficient. – Reproduced
773			_aAmerican Economic Review
906			_aMARKETS
942			_cAR