000			01171nam a22001457a 4500
999			_c520392 _d520392
008			220912b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
100			_aLeive, Adam _934002
245			_aHealth insurance design meets saving incentives: Consumer responses to complex contracts
260			_aAmerican Economic Journal: Applied Economics
300			_a14(2), Apr, 2022: p.200-227
520			_aTo lower health care costs, Health Savings Accounts (HSAs) offer tax incentives encouraging people to trade off current consumption against future consumption. This paper tests whether consumers use HSAs as self-insurance over the life cycle. Using administrative data from a large employer and a regression discontinuity design, I estimate the marginal propensity to consume from HSA assets is 0.85 and reject the neoclassical benchmark of 0. Comparisons with 401(k) saving show most employees do not treat HSA money as fungible with retirement savings. In this setting, HSAs did not reduce health spending and instead increased the share that was financed tax-free. –Reproduced
773			_aAmerican Economic Journal: Applied Economics
906			_aHEALTH INSURANCE
942			_cAR