000			01351nam a22001577a 4500
999			_c520393 _d520393
008			220912b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
100			_aLusher, L. Schnorr, G.C. and Taylor, R. L.C. _934007
245			_aUnemployment insurance as a worker indiscipline device? Evidence from scanner data
260			_aAmerican Economic Journal: Applied Economics
300			_a14(2), Apr, 2022: p.285-319
520			_aWe provide causal evidence of an ex ante moral hazard effect of unemployment insurance (UI) by matching plausibly exogenous changes in UI benefit duration across state-weeks during the Great Recession to high-frequency productivity measures from individual supermarket cashiers. Estimating models with date and cashier-register fixed effects, we identify a modest but statistically significant negative relationship between UI benefits and worker productivity. This effect is strongest for more experienced and less productive cashiers, for whom UI expansions are especially relevant. Additional analyses from the American Time Use Survey reveal a similar increase in shirking during periods with increased UI benefit durations. – Reproduced
650			_aUnemployment insurance (UI), Productivity , Great Recession _934008
773			_aAmerican Economic Journal: Applied Economics
906			_aUNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE
942			_cAR