000			01286nam a22001577a 4500
999			_c520527 _d520527
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100			_aSingh, Sanjay Kumar _934427
245			_aA game theoretic analysis for Ladakh standoff, 2020
260			_aJournal of Defence Studies
300			_a16(1), Jan-Mar, 2022: p.3-18
520			_aA game theoretic analysis for Ladakh standoff is presented in this article. Starting with Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) game, a more flexible game, known as De-escalation game,1 is derived by incorporating the concepts of retaliation and non-escalation probabilities in the PD game. It is shown that by including these concepts, many new possibilities open up for India, which permit it to impose penalty on the aggressor. The intensity of retaliatory actions may be tailored according to the perceived threat; and this strategy allows India to dissuade the aggressor without risking a war or accepting defeat. Finally, options available to India in the light of game theoretic analysis are presented in the article. – Reproduced
650			_aIndia–China disputes, Game theory, De-escalation game, Co-operative Nash equilibrium. _933234
773			_aJournal of Defence Studies
906			_aINDIA - FOREIGN RELATIONS - CHINA
942			_cAR