000			01136nam a22001457a 4500
999			_c520660 _d520660
008			220930b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
100			_aYang, Kai Hao _934696
245			_aSelling consumer data for profit: Optimal market-segmentation design and its consequences
260			_aThe American Economic Review
300			_a112(4), Apr, 2022: p.1364-1393
520			_aA data broker sells market segmentations to a producer with private cost who sells a product to a unit mass of consumers. This paper characterizes the revenue-maximizing mechanisms for the data broker. Every optimal mechanism induces quasi-perfect price discrimination. All the consumers with values above a cost-dependent cutoff buy by paying their values while the rest of consumers do not buy. The characterization implies that market outcomes remain unchanged even if the data broker becomes more powerful—either by gaining the ability to sell access to consumers or by becoming a retailer who purchases the product and sells to the consumers exclusively. – Reproduced
773			_aThe American Economic Review
906			_aCONSUMERS
942			_cAR