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_c520707 _d520707 |
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_a Lee, Samuel and Persson, Petra _934805 |
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| 245 | _aHuman trafficking and regulating prostitution | ||
| 260 | _aAmerican Economic Journal: Economic Policy | ||
| 300 | _a14(3), Aug, 2022: p.87-127 | ||
| 520 | _aCertain markets are illicit because part of the supply is coerced, but little is known about the optimal regulation of such markets. We model a prostitution market with voluntary and coerced prostitutes and ask what regulation can restore the benchmark outcome that would arise under laissez-faire absent coercion. Whereas current policies—decriminalization, criminalization of the buy or sell sides, and licensing—are ineffective against trafficking or harm voluntary suppliers, we show that an alternative policy can restore the benchmark outcome. Our results are relevant to the ongoing debate about decriminalizing prostitution and provide guidance for empirical work on prostitution regulation. – Reproduced | ||
| 650 |
_aHuman trafficking, Prostitution, Trafficking _934806 |
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| 773 | _aAmerican Economic Journal: Economic Policy | ||
| 906 | _aHUMAN TRAFFIKING | ||
| 942 | _cAR | ||