000			01098nam a22001457a 4500
999			_c520709 _d520709
008			221007b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
100			_aTeh, Tat-How _934809
245			_aPlatform governance
260			_aAmerican Economic Journal: Microeconomics
300			_a14(3), Aug, 2022: p.213-254
520			_aPlatforms that intermediate trades—such as Amazon, Airbnb, and eBay—play a regulatory role in deciding how to govern the marketplaces they create. We propose a framework to analyze a platform's nonprice governance design and its incentive to act in a welfare-enhancing manner. We show that the platform's governance design can be distorted toward inducing insufficient or excessive seller competition, depending on the nature of the fee instrument employed by the platform. These results are illustrated with micro-founded applications to a platform's control over seller entry, information provision and recommendations, quality standards, and search-design choices. – Reproduced
773			_aAmerican Economic Journal: Microeconomics
906			_aONLINE TRADE
942			_cAR