000			01117nam a22001577a 4500
999			_c520710 _d520710
008			221007b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
100			_aVásquez, Jorge _934807
245			_aA theory of crime and vigilance
260			_aAmerican Economic Journal: Microeconomics
300			_a14(3), Aug, 2022: p.255-303
520			_aThis paper develops a theory of crime in which potential victims elect their vigilance levels. When vigilance expenses are greater than expected property losses, an increase in penalties raises crime, namely, a criminal Laffer curve emerges. This curve is higher and peaks earlier when victims face higher costs. Thus, the government may wish to subsidize vigilance rather than increase penalties. Indeed, an increase in penalties may shift the vigilance levels further away from their socially optimal ones. Finally, the crime rate first rises and then falls in the property value at stake, which is consistent with the empirical evidence. – Reproduced
650			_aCrime, Vigilance _934808
773			_aAmerican Economic Journal: Microeconomics
906			_aCRIMES
942			_cAR