000			01193nam a22001457a 4500
999			_c521007 _d521007
008			221207b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
100			_aDanz, D., Vesterlund, L. and Wilson, A. _935791
245			_aBelief elicitation and behavioral incentive compatibility
260			_aThe American Economic Review
300			_a112(9), Sep, 2022: p.2851-2883
520			_aSubjective beliefs are crucial for economic inference, yet behavior can challenge the elicitation. We propose that belief elicitation should be incentive compatible not only theoretically but also in a de facto behavioral sense. To demonstrate, we show that the binarized scoring rule, a state-of-the-art elicitation, violates two weak conditions for behavioral incentive compatibility: (i) within the elicitation, information on the incentives increases deviations from truthful reporting; and (ii) in a pure choice over the set of incentives, most deviate from the theorized maximizer. Moreover, we document that deviations are systematic and center-biased, and that the elicited beliefs substantially distort inference. – Reproduced
773			_aThe American Economic Review
906			_aECONOMICS
942			_cAR