000			01068nam a22001457a 4500
999			_c521180 _d521180
008			221226b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
100			_aMensch, Jeffrey _936392
245			_aScreening inattentive buyers
260			_aThe American Economic Review
300			_a112(6), Jun, 2022: p.1949-1984
520			_aInformation plays a crucial role in mechanism design problems. A potential complication is that buyers may be inattentive, and so their information may endogenously and flexibly depend on the offered mechanism. I show that it is without loss of generality to consider contour mechanisms, which comprise triplets of allocation probabilities, prices, and beliefs, and are uniquely determined by a single such point. The mechanism design problem then reduces to Bayesian persuasion along the optimal contour. This reduction has significant implications for both the implementation of the optimal mechanism and the revenues that can be achieved. – Reproduced
773			_aThe American Economic Review
906			_aINFORMATION TECHNOLOGY
942			_cAR