000			01229nam a22001457a 4500
999			_c521188 _d521188
008			221226b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
100			_aCaberal, M., Cui, C. and Dworsky, M.I. _936405
245			_aThe demand for insurance and rationale for a mandate: Evidence from workers' compensation insurance
260			_aThe American Economic Review
300			_a112(5), May, 2022: p.1621-1668
520			_aWorkers' compensation insurance, which provides no-fault coverage for work-related injuries, is mandatory in nearly all states. We use administrative data from a unique market without a coverage mandate to estimate the demand for workers' compensation insurance, leveraging regulatory premium updates for identification. We find that a 1 percent increase in premiums leads to approximately a 0.3 percent decline in coverage. Drawing upon these estimates and data on costs, we examine potential justifications for government intervention to increase coverage. This analysis suggests that several forms of market failure—such as adverse selection, market power, and externalities—may not justify a mandate in this setting.- Reproduced
773			_aThe American Economic Review
906			_aINSURANCE
942			_cAR