000			01158nam a22001457a 4500
999			_c521190 _d521190
008			221226b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
100			_aAryal, G., Bhuller, M. and Lange, F. _936402
245			_aSignaling and employer learning with instruments
260			_aThe American Economic Review
300			_a112(5), May, 2022: p.1669-1702
520			_aThis paper considers the use of instruments to identify and estimate private and social returns to education within a model of employer learning. What an instrument identifies depends on whether it is hidden from, or transparent (i.e., observed) to, the employers. A hidden instrument identifies private returns to education, and a transparent instrument identifies social returns to education. We use variation in compulsory schooling laws across noncentral and central municipalities in Norway to, respectively, construct hidden and transparent instruments. We estimate a private return of 7.9 percent, of which 70 percent is due to increased productivity and the remaining 30 percent is due to signaling.- Reproduced
773			_aThe American Economic Review
906			_aLEARNING
942			_cAR