000			01495nam a22001577a 4500
999			_c521268 _d521268
008			221228b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
100			_aHou, Linke, Liu, Mingxing and Zhang, Dong _936457
245			_aTop-down accountability, social unrest, and anticorruption in China
260			_aAmerican Review of Public Administration
300			_a52(6), Aug, 2022: p.423-438
520			_aWhat motivates front-line officials to curtail corruption? We contend that performance management can reinforce top-down accountability in authoritarian governments and help contain corruption at the local level. Drawing on a nationally representative panel data of approximately 120 villages in China, we find that when anticorruption is prescribed as a salient policy goal in the township-to-village performance evaluation, village officials are incentivized to curb corruption. We further present evidence that the mandate for maintaining social stability propels township-level governments to prioritize the anticorruption work in the performance evaluation of village officials given that corruption constitutes a crucial trigger for social unrest. Our study sheds light on the understanding of performance management, bureaucratic accountability, and anticorruption policies in authoritarian countries. – Reproduced
650			_aPerformance management, Anticorruption, social unrest, China _934935
773			_aAmerican Review of Public Administration
906			_aCORRUPTION
942			_cAR