000			01555nam a22001577a 4500
999			_c521644 _d521644
008			230221b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
100			_aVasvári, Tamás _937360
245			_aBeneficiaries and cost bearers: Evidence on political clientelism from Hungary
260			_aLocal Government Studies
300			_a48(1), Feb, 2022: p.150-177
520			_aPrevious research has found that there is no uniform budget constraint for local governments: politically favoured local governments receive additional funds and are subject to less fiscal discipline. If so, the fair distribution between beneficiaries and cost bearers of the local fiscal policy is not realised. The paper focuses on this phenomenon in the light of political clientelism. We conduct an analysis regarding the Hungarian local government system between 2006 and 2018 to capture the political patterns in local fiscal policy and central granting policy. Local governments in opposition were underfinanced in terms of discretionary and EU funds, and since 2012 they have also had limited access to credit markets to obtain additional funds. Favoured municipalities enjoy more funds and can deliver more projects to their citizens – at the expense of unfavoured ones. The latter struggle to establish a fair distribution of the burdens between beneficiary generations. – Reproduced
650			_aSoft budget constraint, Local government, Political affiliation, Grants, Bailout, Hungary _935715
773			_aLocal Government Studies
906			_aLOCAL GOVERNMENT
942			_cAR