000			01168nam a22001457a 4500
999			_c521776 _d521776
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100			_aAllcott Hunt, and Rafkin, Charlie _938368
245			_aOptimal regulation of e-cigarettes: Theory and evidence
260			_aAmerican Economic Journal: Economic Policy
300			_a14(4), Nov, 2022: p.1-50
520			_aWe model optimal e-cigarette regulation and estimate key parameters. Using tax changes and scanner data, we estimate relatively elastic demand. A demographic shift-share identification strategy suggests limited substitution between e-cigarettes and cigarettes. We field a new survey of public health experts who report that vaping is more harmful than previously believed. In our model's average Monte Carlo simulation, these results imply optimal e-cigarette taxes are higher than recent norms. However, e-cigarette subsidies may be optimal if vaping is a stronger substitute for smoking and is safer than our experts report, or if consumers overestimate the health harms from vaping. – Reproduced
773			_aAmerican Economic Journal: Economic Policy
906			_aDRUG ABUSE
942			_cAR