000			01225nam a22001577a 4500
999			_c521849 _d521849
008			230228b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
100			_aFu, Qiang and Wu, Zenan _937774
245			_aDisclosure and favoritism in sequential elimination contests
260			_aAmerican Economic Journal: Microeconomics
300			_a14(4), Nov, 2022: p.78-121
520			_aWe consider a two-stage contest, in which only a subset of contestants enters the finale. We explore the optimal policy for disclosing contestants' interim status after the preliminary round, i.e., their interim ranking and elimination decision. The optimum depends on the design objective. We fully characterize the conditions under which disclosure or concealment emerges as the optimum. We further allow the organizer to bias the competition based on finalists' interim rankings, which endogenizes the dynamic structure of the contest. Concealment outperforms in generating total effort, while disclosure prevails when maximizing the expected winner's total effort. – Reproduced
650			_aNoncooperative Games, Organization and Market Structure _937775
773			_aAmerican Economic Journal: Microeconomics
906			_aGAME THEORY
942			_cAR