000			01228nam a22001577a 4500
999			_c521850 _d521850
008			230228b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
100			_aKim, J., Palfrey, T.R. and Zeidel, J.R. _937772
245			_aGames played by teams of players
260			_aAmerican Economic Journal: Microeconomics
300			_a14(4), Nov, 2022: p.122-157
520			_aWe develop a general framework for analyzing games where each player is a team and members of the same team all receive the same payoff. The framework combines noncooperative game theory with collective choice theory, and is developed for both strategic form and extensive form games. We introduce the concept of team equilibrium and identify conditions under which it converges to Nash equilibrium with large teams. We identify conditions on collective choice rules such that team decisions are stochastically optimal: the probability the team chooses an action is increasing in its equilibrium expected payoff. The theory is illustrated with some binary action games. – Reproduced
650			_aNoncooperative Games, Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations _937773
773			_aAmerican Economic Journal: Microeconomics
906			_aGAME THEORY
942			_cAR