000			01114nam a22001457a 4500
999			_c521851 _d521851
008			230228b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
100			_aAli, S. Nageeb and Miller, David A. _937771
245			_aCommunication and cooperation in markets
260			_aAmerican Economic Journal: Microeconomics
300			_a14(4), Nov, 2022: p.200-217
520			_aMany markets rely on traders truthfully communicating who has cheated in the past and ostracizing those traders from future trade. This paper investigates when truthful communication is incentive compatible. We find that if each side has a myopic incentive to deviate, then communication incentives are satisfied only when the volume of trade is low. By contrast, if only one side has a myopic incentive to deviate, then communication incentives do not constrain the volume of supportable trade. Accordingly, there are strong gains from structuring trade so that one side either moves first or has its cooperation guaranteed by external enforcement.- Reproduced
773			_aAmerican Economic Journal: Microeconomics
906			_aMARKETS
942			_cAR