000			01533nam a22001577a 4500
999			_c522016 _d522016
008			230307b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
100			_aKarlas, Jan _938280
245			_aWhy states inform: Compliance with self-reporting obligations in universal treaty regimes
260			_aInternational Political Science Review
300			_a43(4), Sep, 2022: p.531-546
520			_aWhy do some states largely comply with their self-reporting obligations in international institutions, while others fulfil them only irregularly? In this article, I conduct the first large-N analysis of self-reporting that comprises several important areas of international cooperation. This analysis relies on an original and large dataset that covers self-reporting within 25 universal arms control, environmental and human rights agreements. The empirical results find little evidence for an intuitive view that the support of states for the respective treaties and the conformity of state policies with the general goals of those treaties drive compliance with self-reporting obligations. Instead, the article reveals that this compliance is mainly influenced by the reporting behaviour of the country’s regional peers and by national economic and administrative capacities.- Reproduced
650			_aInternational Institutions, international cooperation, Ratification, Compliance, Monitoring arms control, The environment, Human rights. _936643
773			_aInternational Political Science Review
906			_aGLOBAL GOVERNANCE
942			_cAR