000			01579nam a22001577a 4500
999			_c522017 _d522017
008			230307b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
100			_aCepaluni, Gabriel and Fernandes, Ivan Filipe _938279
245			_aUnited we stand and divided we fall: Coalitions in the GATT/WTO negotiations
260			_aInternational Political Science Review
300			_a43(4), Sep, 2022: p.547-563
520			_aCoalition formation is considered an important tool to leverage bargaining power in GATT/WTO negotiations. While most of the literature has focused on developing countries, we show that sizable economies are the primary users of coalitions at the GATT/WTO. We also find evidence that middle powers do not exhibit distinctive collectivist behavior at the WTO. There is a linear and strong relationship between countries’ economic power—measured as real GDP—and coalition participation within the GATT/WTO system. We explain these results, presenting evidence that large economies—countries that have greater trade negotiations power—join coalitions more often because they are better equipped to absorb transaction costs and more prepared to deal with the uncertainty of WTO negotiations. We also found a relationship between coalition entry and trade openness, with countries more open to trade joining coalitions more often. – Reproduced
650			_aWorld trade organization, Trade coalitions, Economic power, International trade negotiations, Democracy. _936645
773			_aInternational Political Science Review
906			_aINTERNATIONAL TRADE
942			_cAR