000			01132nam a22001457a 4500
999			_c522271 _d522271
008			230328b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
100			_aDoornik, B.V., Schoenherr, D. and Skrastins, J. _939138
245			_aStrategic formal layoffs: Unemployment insurance and informal labor markets
260			_aAmerican Economic Journal: Applied Economics
300			_a15(1), Jan, 2023: p.292-318
520			_aExploiting an unemployment insurance reform in Brazil, we study incentive effects of UI in the presence of informal labor markets. We find that eligibility for UI benefits increases formal layoffs by 11 percent. Most of the additional layoffs are related to workers transitioning to informal employment. We further document formal layoff and recall patterns consistent with rent extraction from the UI system. Workers are laid off as they become eligible for UI benefits and recalled when benefits cease. These patterns are stronger for industries and municipalities with a high degree of labor market informality.- Reproduced
773			_aAmerican Economic Journal: Applied Economics
906			_aEMPLOYMENT
942			_cAR