000			01206nam a22001457a 4500
999			_c522290 _d522290
008			230328b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
100			_aOnuchic, Paula and Ray, Debraj _939271
245			_aSignaling and discrimination in collaborative projects
260			_aThe American Economic Review
300			_a113(1), Jan, 2023: p.210-252
520			_aWe study collaborative work in pairs when potential collaborators are motivated by the reputational implications of (joint or solo) projects. In equilibrium, individual collaboration strategies both influence and are influenced by the public assignment of credit for joint work across the two partners. We investigate the fragility of collaboration to small biases in the public's credit assignment. When collaborators are symmetric, symmetric equilibria are often fragile, and in nonfragile equilibria individuals receive asymmetric collaborative credit based on payoff-irrelevant "identities." We study payoff distributions across identities within asymmetric equilibria, and compare aggregate welfare across symmetric and asymmetric equilibria.- Reproduced
773			_aThe American Economic Review
906			_aCOLLABORATIVE WORK
942			_cAR