000			01075nam a22001457a 4500
999			_c522421 _d522421
008			230411b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
100			_aKubitz, Greg _939717
245			_aTwo-stage contests with private information
260			_aAmerican Economic Journal: Microeconomics
300			_a15(1), Feb, 2023: p.239-287
520			_aIn perfectly discriminating contests with private information, low-ability contestants prefer to appear strong, while high-ability contestants prefer to appear weak. In a two-stage contest, this leads to a unique symmetric equilibrium with partial pooling in the first stage. A higher output in the first contest leads to a weakly higher belief about the contestant's ability entering the second contest. We characterize this unique equilibrium when cost of effort is linear and show how the prize allocation and type distribution impact contestants' expected output, payoffs, and the probability of surprise victories.- Reproduced
773			_aAmerican Economic Journal: Microeconomics
906			_aPRIVATE INFORMATION
942			_cAR