000			01219nam a22001457a 4500
999			_c522423 _d522423
008			230411b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
100			_aLorecchio, Caio and Monte, Daniel _939726
245			_aDynamic information design under constrained communication rules
260			_aAmerican Economic Journal: Microeconomics
300			_a15(1), Feb, 2023: p.359-398
520			_aAn information designer wishes to persuade agents to invest in a project of unknown quality. To do so, she must induce investment and collect feedback from these investments. Motivated by data regulations and simplicity concerns, our designer faces communication constraints. These constraints hinder her without benefiting the agents: they impose an upper bound on the induced belief spread, limiting persuasion. Nevertheless, two-rating systems (direct recommendations) are the optimal design when experimentation is needed to generate information and approximate the designer's first-best payoff for specific feedback structures. When the designer has altruistic motives, constrained rules significantly decrease welfare. – Reproduced
773			_aAmerican Economic Journal: Microeconomics
906			_aCOMMUNICATION
942			_cAR