000			01210nam a22001457a 4500
999			_c522426 _d522426
008			230411b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
100			_aCovert, Thomas R. and Sweeney, Richard L. _940034
245			_aRelinquishing riches: Auctions versus informal negotiations in Texas oil and gas leasing
260			_aThe American: Economic Reviews
300			_a113(3), Mar, 2023: p. 628-663
520			_aThis paper compares outcomes from informally negotiated oil and gas leases to those awarded via centralized auction. We focus on Texas, where legislative decisions in the early twentieth century assigned thousands of proximate parcels to different mineral allocation mechanisms. We show that during the fracking boom, which began unexpectedly decades later, auctioned leases generated at least 55 percent larger up-front payments and 40 percent more output than negotiated leases did. These results suggest large potential gains from employing centralized, formal mechanisms in markets that traditionally allocate in an unstructured fashion, including the broader $3 trillion market for privately owned minerals.- Reproduced
773			_aThe American: Economic Reviews
906			_aECONOMICS
942			_cAR