000			01008nam a22001457a 4500
999			_c522437 _d522437
008			230411b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
100			_aDilmé, Francesc _940044
245			_aRobust information transmission
260			_aAmerican Economic Review: Insights
300			_a5(1), Mar, 2023: p.111-124
520			_aThis paper investigates robust information transmission between a sender and a receiver in the Crawford and Sobel (1982) model. We characterize behavior that remains equilibrium behavior independently of the form of a small communication cost. Under standard conditions, we find that an equilibrium outcome is robust if and only if it features a maximal number of on-path actions and each is induced by a single message. The result extends regardless of the direction of the bias, the number of available messages, or whether the objectives of the sender and the receiver are aligned.- Reproduced
773			_aAmerican Economic Review: Insights
906			_aCOMMUNICATION
942			_cAR