000			01144nam a22001457a 4500
999			_c522872 _d522872
008			230609b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
100			_aKashyap, Anil K. et al _941685
245			_aIs there too much benchmarking in asset management?
260			_aThe American Economic Review
300			_a113(4), Apr, 2023: p.1112-1141
520			_aWe propose a tractable model of asset management in which benchmarking arises endogenously, and analyze its welfare consequences. Fund managers' portfolios are not contractible and they incur private costs in running them. Incentive contracts for fund managers create a pecuniary externality through their effect on asset prices. Benchmarking inflates asset prices and creates crowded trades. The crowding reduces the effectiveness of benchmarking in incentive contracts for others, which fund investors fail to account for. A social planner, recognizing the crowding, opts for contracts with less benchmarking and less incentive provision. The planner also delivers lower asset management costs.- Reproduced
773			_aThe American Economic Review
906			_aASSET MANAGEMENT
942			_cAR