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_aLu, Jiahuan and Hung, Wan-Ju _942216 |
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| 245 | _aWhat brings contracting back in-house: A synthesis of international evidence | ||
| 260 | _aInternational Review of Administrative Sciences | ||
| 300 | _a89(2), Jun, 2023: p.595-610 | ||
| 520 | _aContracting back-in has received growing scholarly attention, but there is little empirical consensus in the literature as to what drives governments to bring previously contracted work back in-house and to what extent. This study performs a meta-analysis to synthesize 332 effect sizes from 16 existing studies concerning the antecedents of contracting back-in across different countries. The analysis indicates that contracting back-in is a market management strategy driven by low levels of market competition, high proportions of for-profit contractors, insufficient cost savings, and inadequate contract management. Meanwhile, contracting back-in is a political move shaped by left-wing political ideology and employee opposition to outsourcing. Environmental factors including unemployment rate, population size, and population density also play a role. This study provides empirical generalizations of previous results and contributes a more coherent knowledge base for future studies.- Reproduced | ||
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_aGovernment contracting, Contracting back-in, Reverse contracting, Mera-analysis _939567 |
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| 773 | _aInternational Review of Administrative Sciences | ||
| 906 | _aGOVERNMENT CONTRACTING | ||
| 942 | _cAR | ||