000			01177nam a22001457a 4500
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100			_aCraig, Ashley C. _943014
245			_aOptimal income taxation with spillovers from employer learning
260			_aAmerican Economic Journal: Economic Policy
300			_a15(2), May, 2023: p.82-125
520			_aAuthor study optimal income taxation when human capital investment is imperfectly observable by employers. In the model, Bayesian inference about worker productivity compresses the wage distribution, lowering the private return to human capital investment. An externality arises: given the same information, employers are more optimistic about each individual if workers are generally more productive. The significance of this externality hinges on the accuracy of employers' beliefs and the responsiveness of human capital. For the United States, taking it into account lowers optimal marginal tax rates for most workers, reducing them by a maximum of 9–13 percentage points between $50,000 and $100,000. – Reproduced
773			_aAmerican Economic Journal: Economic Policy
906			_aTAXATION
942			_cAR