000			01343pab a2200157 454500
008			180718b2002 xxu||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
100			_aBearce, David H.
245			_aMonetary divergence: domestic political institutions and the monetary autonomy-exchange rate stability trade off
260			_c2002
300			_ap.194-220.
362			_aMar
520			_aUnder capital mobility, governments face a political choice: hold an autonomous monetary policy with currency instability or stabilize exchange rates with the sacrifice of policy autonomy. This article examines what domestic political factors led the advanced industrial democracies to choose an autonomous monetary policy and what factors led them instead to choose stable exchange rates in the post-Bretton Woods era. Leftist-led governments have opted for an autonomous loose fiscal-tight monetary policy mix associated with exchange rate instability. Rightist-led governments have chosen a tight fiscal-loose monetary policy mix associated with exchange rate stability. These results are important because they help reestablish partisan agency in terms of monetary - exchange rate policy making, even under the structural constraint of inter-national capital mobility. - Reproduced.
650			_aExchange rates
773			_aComparative Political Studies
909			_a52355
999			_c52355 _d52355