000			01359pab a2200193 454500
008			180718b2002 xxu||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
100			_aMilest-Ferretti, Gian Maria
245			_aElectoral systems and public spending
260			_c2002
300			_ap.609-55.
362			_aMay
520			_aWe study the effects of electoral institutions on the size and composition of public expenditure in OECD and Latin American countries. We emphasize the distinction between purchases of goods and services, which are easier to target geographically, and transfers, which are easier to target across social groups. We present a theoretical model in which voters anticipating government policymaking under different electoral systems have an incentive to elect representatives more prone to transfer (public good) spending in proportional (majoritarian) systems. The model also predicts higher total primary spending in proportional (majoritarian) systems when the share of transfer spending is high (low). After defining rigorous measures of proportionality to be used in the empirical investigation, we find considerable support for our predictions. - Reproduced.
650			_apublic expenditure
650			_aElectoral systems
700			_aRostagno, Massimo
700			_aPerotti, Roberto
773			_aQuarterly Journal of Economics
909			_a52360
999			_c52360 _d52360