000			01146nam a22001577a 4500
999			_c523633 _d523633
008			230915b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
100			_aMyerson, Roger B. _943713
245			_aGame theory and the first world war
260			_aJournal of Economic Literature
300			_a61(2), Jun, 2023: p.716-735
520			_aBooks by Scott Wolford and Roger Ransom show how economic theories of games and decisions can be fruitfully applied to problems in World War I. This vital application offers fundamental insights into the analytical methods of game theory. Public random variables may be essential factors in war-of-attrition games. An assumption that nations can coordinate on Pareto-superior equilibria may become less tenable when nations are at war. Interpreting a surprising mistake as evidence of an unlikely type can have serious consequences. The ability of leaders to foster consistent beliefs within a cohesive society can create inconsistency of beliefs between nations at war.- Reproduced
650			_aGame theory, First world war _943714
773			_aJournal of Economic Literature
906			_aGAME THEORY
942			_cAR