000			01085nam a22001457a 4500
999			_c523648 _d523648
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100			_aSturm, John _943731
245			_aHow should sanctions account for bystander countries?
260			_aAEA Papers and Proceedings
300			_a113, May, 2023: p.39-42
520			_aNeutral "bystander countries" have profoundly shaped the impact of trade sanctions imposed on Russia following its invasion of Ukraine. How should sanctions account for the presence of such bystanders? I study this question in a simple trade model where a sanctioning country places tariffs on imports from a sanctioned country in the presence of a neutral third country. Optimal tariffs-as-sanctions are lower on goods that the sanctioner can import from bystanders. On goods that the sanctionee can export to bystanders, tariffs-as-sanctions are higher given an elasticity of (excess) supply to the sanctioner but lower given a total elasticity of supply.- Reproduced
773			_aAEA Papers and Proceedings
906			_aFINANCIAL SANCTIONS
942			_cAR