000			01170nam a22001457a 4500
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100			_aOuss, Aurelie and Stevenson, Megan _943753
245			_aDoes cash bail deter misconduct?
260			_aAmerican Economic Journal: Applied Economies
300			_a15(3), Jul, 2023: p.150-182
520			_aCourts routinely use low cash bail as a financial incentive to ensure released defendants appear in court and abstain from crime. This can create burdens for defendants with little empirical evidence on its efficacy. We exploit a prosecutor-driven reform that led to a sharp reduction in low cash bail and pretrial supervision, with no effect on pretrial detention, to test whether such incentive mechanisms succeed at their intended purpose. We find no evidence that financial collateral has a deterrent effect on failure to appear or pretrial crime. This paper also contributes to the literature on legal actor discretion, showing that nonbinding reforms may have limited impact on jail populations.- Reproduced
773			_aAmerican Economic Journal: Applied Economies
906			_aCRIMINAL JUSTICE
942			_cAR