000			01175nam a22001337a 4500
999			_c523655 _d523655
008			230915b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
100			_aChin, Moya _943752
245			_a When do politicians appeal broadly? The economic consequences of electoral rules in Brazil
260			_aAmerican Economic Journal: Applied Economies
300			_a15(3), Jul, 2023: p.183-209
520			_aElectoral rules determine how voters' preferences are aggregated and translated into political representation. Using a regression discontinuity design, I contrast single- and two-round elections in Brazil. In two-round elections, the eventual winner must obtain at least 50 percent of the vote. I show that two-round elections provide incentives for candidates to secure a broader base of support and provide public goods more broadly. Candidates represent a more geographically diverse group of voters, public schools have more resources, and there is less variation in resources across schools. Effects appear to be driven by strategic responses of candidates rather than differential entry into races.- Reproduced
773			_aAmerican Economic Journal: Applied Economies
942			_cAR