000			01228nam a22001457a 4500
999			_c523657 _d523657
008			230915b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
100			_aFischer, T., Frolich, M. and Landmann, A. _943754
245			_aAdverse selection in low-income health insurance markets: Evidence from an RCT in Pakistan
260			_aAmerican Economic Journal: Applied Economies
300			_a15(3), Jul, 2023: p.313-340
520			_aWe present robust evidence on adverse selection in hospitalization insurance for low-income individuals that received first-time access to insurance. A large randomized control trial from Pakistan allows us to separate adverse selection from moral hazard, estimate how selection changes at different points of the demand curve, and test simple measures to limit adverse selection. The results reveal substantial selection in individual policies, leading to welfare losses and the threat of a market breakdown. Bundling insurance policies at the household level or higher almost eliminates adverse selection, thus mitigating its welfare consequences and facilitating sustainable insurance supply.- Reproduced
773			_aAmerican Economic Journal: Applied Economies
906			_aHEALTH INSURANCE
942			_cAR