000			01191nam a22001457a 4500
999			_c523665 _d523665
008			230918b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
100			_aGaynor, M., Mehta, N. and Shubik, S.R. _943763
245			_aOptimal contracting with altruistic agents: Medicare payments for dialysis drugs
260			_aThe American Economic Review
300			_a113(6), Jun, 2023: p.1530-1571
520			_aWe study health-care provider agency and optimal payments, considering an expensive medication for dialysis patients. Using Medicare claims data we estimate a structural model of treatment decisions, in which providers differ in their altruism and marginal costs, and this heterogeneity is unobservable to the government. In a novel application of nonlinear pricing methods, we empirically characterize the optimal contracts in this environment. The optimal contracts eliminate medically excessive dosages and reduce expenditures, resulting in approximately $300 million in annual gains from better contracting. This approach could be applied to a broad class of problems in healthcare payment policy.- Reproduced
773			_aThe American Economic Review
906			_aHEALTH SERVICES
942			_cAR