000			01003nam a22001457a 4500
999			_c523667 _d523667
008			230918b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
100			_aAmador, Manuel and Phelan, Christopher _943766
245			_aReputation and partial default
260			_aThe American Economic Review: Insights
300			_a5(2), Jun, 2023: p.158-172
520			_aThis paper presents a continuous-time reputation model of sovereign debt allowing for both varying levels of partial default and full default. In it, a government can be a nonstrategic commitment type or a strategic opportunistic type, and a government's reputation is its equilibrium Bayesian posterior of being the commitment type. Our equilibrium has that for bond levels reachable by both types without defaulting, bigger partial defaults (or bigger haircuts for bond holders) imply higher interest rates for subsequent bond issuances, as in the data.- Reproduced
773			_aThe American Economic Review: Insights
906			_aDEBTS
942			_cAR