000			01647nam a22001457a 4500
999			_c524077 _d524077
008			231027b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
100			_aTepe, Markus et al _945007
245			_aAdministrative delegation revisited: Experimental evidence on the behavioural consequences of public service motivation and risk aversion
260			_aInternational Review of Administrative Sciences
300			_a89(3), Sep, 2023: p.613-631
520			_aGetting a grip on issues of administrative delegation is key to the performance of public organizations. The oversight game models delegation as a conflict of interest between an inspector and an inspectee to act in the interests of the former. This study tests alternative solutions to overcome ‘shirking’ in the oversight game. Specifically, we test the effect of external incentives, as implied by the game-theoretical solution, against the role of intrinsic factors, namely, public service motivation and job-related risk aversion. Evidence from a laboratory (N = 208) and survey experiment (N = 794) show that both the game-theoretical approach, which inspired new public management, and public service motivation, as its antithesis, fail to explain subjects’ behaviour. Instead, job-related risk aversion makes oversight more and ‘shirking’ less likely. This finding hints towards a more differentiated view of public employees’ risk attitudes to improve administrative delegation. – Reproduced https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/00208523211073259
773			_aInternational Review of Administrative Sciences
906			_aPUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
942			_cAR