000			01582nam a22001577a 4500
999			_c524088 _d524088
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100			_aPerez, Marybel and Agafonow, Alejandro _945032
245			_aThe control of the policy advice industry: How patrons defer their decision-rights to think tank boards
260			_aInternational Review of Administrative Sciences
300			_a89(3), Sep, 2023: p.808-824
520			_aPatrons of think tanks—for example, governments, corporations, philanthropists, NGOs, and so forth—may control think tanks’ boards, that is, their highest decision-making body. Whether patrons are likely to control boards is a question that remains under-explored and under-theorised in public administration and governance scholarship. It is posited that patrons are likely to control boards when the marginal benefit of partaking in decision-making does not exceed the cost of information transfer. The comparative examination of International Relations think tanks’ statutes shows that patron control is substantial. However, patronage does not always guarantee board control. Patron control is moderated by the nature of the transaction. The conclusion assesses patron control concerning decision-making processes in the think tank and the idiosyncratic character of policy advice. – Reproduced https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/00208523221133065
650			_aPolicy advice industry, Think tank boards _945033
773			_aInternational Review of Administrative Sciences
906			_aPUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
942			_cAR