000			01235nam a22001457a 4500
999			_c524223 _d524223
008			231106b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
100			_aBest, M.C., Hjort, J. and Szakonyi, D. _945709
245			_aIndividuals and organizations as sources of state effectiveness
260			_aThe American Economic Review
300			_a113(8), Aug, 2023: p.2121-2167
520			_aBureaucrats implement policy. How important are they for a state's productivity? And do the trade-offs between policies depend on their effectiveness? Using data on 16 million public purchases in Russia, we show that 39 percent of the variation in prices paid for narrowly defined items is due to the individual bureaucrats and organizations who manage procurement. Low-price buyers also display higher spending quality. Theory suggests that such differences in effectiveness can be pivotal for policy design. To illustrate, we show that a common one—bid preferences for domestic suppliers—substantially improves procurement performance, but only when implemented by ineffective bureaucrats.- Reproduced https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/aer.20191598
773			_aThe American Economic Review
906			_aPUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
942			_cAR